AIG New Zealand event in Auckland

On March 22nd Hagai spoke in Auckland at a lunch event for AIG New Zealand, for their key brokers and customers, in association with Marsh New Zealand, on the current geopolitical environment and its economic implications.

Head of AIG New Zealand, Liam Pomfret, posted on LinkedIn that Hagai’s analysis “provides comfort in what feels like chaos, showing the true dynamics and patterns behind world events”, while AIG NZ Head of Marketing + Communications, Nicola Vallance, posted “If you ever get the opportunity to hear Hagai speak, put all other plans aside and go. You will leave in equal parts alarmed and reassured but always with fascinating insight into the geopolitical forces driving conflicts and agendas around the world and how they impact business here in New Zealand (or wherever you are!). “

Times Radio interview - Iraq, Iran... World War?!?

On Jan 29th Hagai spoke with Mariella Frostrup on Times Radio about the attacks in Iraq, the Iran situation and whether this is all leading us to a World War!

Hagai emphasised that while we are in a very dangerous world right now, this is very different to the late 1930s (for example), in large part because of what we have learned from what happened then!

He also made the point that Iran is fighting indirectly through its affiliated militias - its proxies - and while this poses headaches and complex challenges to Western and regional political and military decision-makers, it is very different from open warfare between states. Indeed, Iran’s actions often emphasise its weakness rather than its strength, and it knows all too well that it faces external and internal threats from a wider escalation in hostilities.

As he states in the interview, the bad news is that the world is certainly getting more dangerous, but the good news is that global decision-makers are acutely aware of the dangers of allowing the domino effects that led to the previous World Wars.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/radio/show/20240129-24735/2024-01-29

Israel-Hamas conflict - Escalation Scenarios: Lebanon, Iran… Ukraine?

Israel-Hamas conflict - Escalation Scenarios: Lebanon, Iran… Ukraine?

Lots of debate, understandably, about possible escalation of the conflict once Israel’s ground offensive in Gaza begins. Fuelled of course by public statements from Iran.

Some thoughts on factors that will influence some key escalation, and containment, scenarios:-

Worth remembering that Hizbollah has not sought conflict with Israel since 2006, indeed it has actively staying out of each of the subsequent Israel-Hamas conflicts (2008/9, 2012, 2014, etc). This was largely because Iran instructed them to - a combination of GFC, low oil prices and crippling sanctions (i.e. liquidity) limited Iran’s capacity to re-arm them. And I emphasise ‘re-arm’ - the issue is not whether Hizbollah has the ability to fight, the worry for Iran is whether they can re-arm them after a major conflict. That dynamic has not significantly changed - indeed the pressure from US + allies to come will in fact further exacerbate these dynamics.

There are real fears of a collapse of the Lebanese state - already on the economic, social and political cliff’s edge - which may or may not result in a new reality favourable to Iran.

The events of the last 11 days of course have dramatically changed other regional dynamics, and Hizbollah and Iran may feel the necessity to now ‘do something’, or at least be ‘seen to be doing something’. But for the reasons stated above Iran has reasons not to have Hizbollah ‘go all in’ - thus the very limited engagement/activity until now.

This will undoubtedly change when the Israel ground assault of Gaza begins, but whether Hizbollah (and Iran) will do more than launch missile barrages on Israeli population centres (or even do this), combined with current limited actions around the border area, is by no means a certainty.

There are also key international push-and-pull factors:-

United States - It is hugely influential on Hizbollah and Iranian decision-making that the US has deployed its military might right off the coast, and directly (inc. Biden himself) warned that it will be used if Hizbollah joins Hamas in the fight. Cruise missiles hitting Hizbollah in Lebanon, or Iranian assets in Syria, can’t be ignored. This said, direct US military intervention on the ground remains unlikely unless there is major escalation - the US hardly has a positive history of intervening in Lebanon (and that is putting it mildly!), something US planners are all too aware of.

Russia/Ukraine - Iran however will take confidence from the fact the the Russians ‘owe’ them for their military support of Putin in Ukraine, and that Putin would love nothing more than see the US dragged into an unpopular conflict in the Middle-East. The more military assets it has to deploy, and to give to Israel, the less that gets given to Ukraine, with the focus of the US military and politicians increasingly moving away from supporting Ukraine.

LinkedIn post - Israel-Hamas conflict - Escalation Scenarios: Lebanon, Iran… Ukraine?

Strategic assessment of the Hamas atrocity in Israel + its consequences

My political and strategic analysis - published in ‘The National’ newspaper in the UAE - of the truly horrific events unfolding in Israel, the scandalous failures that left Israel open to this slaughter, and the future implications for Israel and the Middle-East.

The key points:-

1. The timing of Hamas’ attack are so easily identified, making the surprise achieved all the more unconscionable: one, months of Israeli and Palestinian violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as Israel’s most right-wing government pushed policies that angered Palestinians; two, Israeli government ministers’ visits to Saudi Arabia as it seemed a Saudi-Israel normalisation deal was in the works – a nightmare scenario for Hamas’s backers in Iran; three, Iran’s desire to seek revenge after numerous Israeli intelligence successes against it in recent years, including many inside the country; four, the 50th anniversary of the 1973 war; and five, a Jewish holiday that also was Shabbat/the sabbath - exactly the timing chosen for the attack in 1973.

2. On the strategic side, Israel’s huge loss, and Iran’s huge gain, is that this kills the Saudi-Israel normalisation deal (at least in the short-term).

3. The potential that Israel will now reassess military action against Iran and its nuclear facilities. If Iranian intelligence played a key role in what is being called ‘Israel’s 9/11’ Israeli leaders may feel now is the time to hit Iran, and hit it hard.

4. PM Netanyahu and the far-Right’s security credentials - the foundation of their political platform and legitimacy - have been shattered. Major political change, when this is taken together with the judicial reform controversy etc, is now inevitable. Whether it hurls Israel further to the right, or in a very different direction, we will have to assess once the fighting stops and ‘usual’ (what ever that means in Israel) politics resumes.

5. In the long-term however events may develop in a way that could surprise many. The 1973 Yom Kippur war led Israel to reassess its strategic reality and the status of the land it had taken in 1967. And the Arab world grudgingly had to accept that even when Israel is knocked down, it is very quickly back up fighting. This resulted in the previously unthinkable land-for-peace deal in 1979, Egypt’s recognition of Israel and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Cairo. In time, the 1973 “defeat” thus led to the strengthening of Israel’s security and regional status rather than the diminishing of it. This latest tragedy demands similar introspection and the questioning of Israel’s political direction of travel - might today’s intelligence and security failures lead in time to equally dramatic changes in Israel’s strategic outlook?

Link to article - War with Gaza could lead to a new strategic reality for Israel

Link to - LinkedIn post and discussion

YPO Geopolitical Summit, House of Lords

On April 17th Hagai participated on an expert panel on Middle-East Geopolitics at the Young Presidents Organisation (YPO) global Geopolitical Summit at the House of Lords in London.

YPO, founded in 1950, is the world’s largest leadership community of CEOs/chief executives — over 30,000 members globally coming together “to become better leaders and better people”.

The two day event included panels on key global and regional geopolitical dynamics, with other speakers including the Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK, former UK Defence Ministers, Generals and Admirals, current members of the House of Commons and House of Lords, and leading academics and other experts.

Hagai was thanked by the organisers for his “extraordinarily informed and worthwhile” contribution to the discussions.

Article - Israel's judicial reforms could initiate a collapse of the US-Israel special relationship.

Hagai today had an Opinion piece published in the UAE newspaper The National on how the judicial legislation in Israel threatens to undermine the entire basis of US and international recognition of Israel. It highlights that US recognition of the new State of Israel in the late 1940s was contingent on Israel proving it was a liberal democracy, and argue that today US support of Israel is much more fragile than people think and thus is under threat if Israel moves away from this liberal democratic basis.

Israel's judicial reforms could initiate a collapse of the US-Israel special relationship

Bradseco webinar - Geopolitics + the Outlook for Oil Markets

On October 19th 2022 Hagai gave a webinar briefing for global clients of Bradesco BBI, the Brazilian investment bank, entitled Geopolitics + the Outlook for Oil Markets.

Hagai addressed recent developments including the war in Ukraine and its economic effects, the OPEC+ production cut, its implications and what it tells us about US-Saudi and US-Russian relations, China-US dynamics, and impacts on energy transition.

Hagai was thanked by the organisers for “a simply excellent!” briefing.

al-Zawahiri killing article / Afghanistan -Taliban - Terrorism

Today Hagai had published a Comment & Opinion piece in the South China Morning Post - the historic English language newspaper of Hong Kong - on the killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and what him being found by the US in Kabul might tell us about the Taliban’s internal disputes in regards relations with al-Qaeda and other terror factions. Attention has falllen on the Haqqani, who it seems were al-Zawahiri’s hosts. Whether the Taliban limits itself to austere Islamist domestic policies or again involves itself in external jihadist activity going forward may depend on the winners and losers of the all-Zawahiri affair: Al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri is dead, but Afghanistan terror threat remains a global concern

This follows Hagai’s analysis, in the same newspaper back in September 2021, on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences: US leaving Afghanistan clears a lucrative but risky path for China and others

AIG New Zealand + Australia virtual event

On the morning of August 4th - the evening of August 3rd in London! - Hagai gave a virtual seminar for AIG in New Zealand and Australia on taking control during these times of great geopolitical instability.

It was a great pleaure to work again with AIG New Zealand and Australia, and many fantastic and probing questions were asked by the NZ and Aussie attendees.

BBC News Channel interview

On April 20th 2022 Hagai appeared on the BBC News Channel to discuss the latest Israeli-Palestinian tensions and the challenges of resolving the conflict with all the current instability and uncertainty across the rest of the Middle-East.

Keynote - AIG Risk Management Academy (ARMA)

On March 15th Hagai again addressed the AIG Risk Management Academy (ARMA).

Having address the current academy group at the first event 18 months ago, Hagai now addressed the final gathering, on the topic of geopolitical impacts on the corporate risk environment.

Hagai was thanked by the organisers for “another great session… the content was brilliant”

Keynote - Arowana Circle of Leadership seminar

On March 16th Hagai virtually addressed this year’s Arowana global Circle of Leadership (COL) group.

Arowana is an award winning global B Corporation that has a number of operating companies and investments, including in electric vehicles, renewable energy, vocational education, technology and software venture capital, and impact asset management.

Circle of Leadership is the centrepiece programme of Arowana.U, their in-house learning and development academy.

Hagai addressed current geopolitical dynamics with a specific focus on Ukraine/Russia and Saudi Arabia/the Middle-East.

Arowana Founder Kevin Chin posted afterward that it was “One of the best all time COL talks”.

SCMP Opinion - US leaving Afghanistan clears a lucrative but risky path for China and others

US leaving Afghanistan clears a lucrative but risky path for China and others

By Hagai M. Segal

South China Morning Post - Sept 8 2021.

Never get involved in a land war in Asia. Anyone who has seen the 1987 action-adventure film The Princess Bride can tell you that. Yet, it is a lesson repeatedly ignored by US policymakers, culminating in the events we have witnessed in Kabul and across Afghanistan. Wide-ranging implications of the Taliban’s victory will be with us for years, and China is vying to be a major beneficiary.

Tony Blair, who took Britain into Afghanistan, has called the US departure from the country a dangerous abandonment that will have “every jihadist group around the word cheering”.

The return of Taliban rule has again raised the spectre of a global jihadist terror threat emanating from Afghanistan. After the September 11 attacks, the United States came to understand that a key intelligence failure in the run-up to the attacks had been missing the role of the Taliban in lending state resources to al-Qaeda, which turned the terror group from a peripheral menace to a global threat.

In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda developed a truly global network. Years of “terror tourism” to the country facilitated gatherings of jihadists from across the globe, from which emerged ideas and tactics such as using passenger aircraft as guided missiles.

Yet, the reality today is more nuanced. There is cautious confidence in the Western intelligence community that the Taliban has no interest in allowing Afghanistan to again be a base for a catastrophic terror attack on the West. The Taliban leadership knows the only reason any foreign power will invade again is if they find a September 11-type attack was organised from Afghan territory. The consequences of hosting al-Qaeda was 20 years of foreign occupation and the death of tens of thousands of their fighters, and the Taliban does not desire a repeat.

What has changed from the Taliban of the 1990s is a desire to avoid a return to isolationism and international pariahdom. Its Islamic state, hugely problematic as it will still be from a human rights perspective, will for now be tempered by a certain pragmatism. This might mean little to those in the country whose rights and freedoms will now be curtailed, but it will result in a different engagement with the outside world.

This more nuanced dynamic was illustrated in the attack by Islamic State Khorasan (Isis-K) at Kabul airport on August 26. This was a murderous assault on the US and its allies, but also a political attack aimed at undermining Taliban authority. Isis-K have characterised the Taliban as “filthy nationalists” more interested in ruling Afghanistan than fighting a wider jihad. Direct fighting between the groups has gone on for years.

This new Taliban context has led certain Islamic-oriented states, especially Qatar and Turkey, and US global competitors – most notably China – to eye opportunity in Afghanistan. Qatar and Turkey, historic US allies who in recent years have increasingly forged an Islamic path in their political orientation, have moved quickly to take advantage.

For years, Qatar has moderated and hosted secret US-Taliban talks that led to former US president Donald Trump committing the US to leave Afghanistan. Qatar already has officials on the ground in Kabul helping the Taliban transition to power. Turkey, a Nato member that has allied itself with Russia and Iran in the ongoing conflict in Syria, is increasingly at odds with the US. It is seeking influence in the post-US Afghanistan as it prioritises forging new alliances away from the US and its principal allies.

For China, its policy of non-intervention is a perfect mechanism for engaging with the Taliban’s Afghanistan. It presents China with a double opportunity to highlight its belief in the folly of intervention and nation-building while furthering its strategic reach and economic links across Asia. Cooperation on building national infrastructure will dominate, with potential already for linking and extending the Pakistani section of the Belt and Road Initiative in partnership with the Taliban.

China is likely to be much more cautious in Afghanistan than in Syria and Iran, where in recent years it has made huge economic inroads. Beijing is all too aware of the quagmire Afghanistan has been for foreign powers in the past two centuries. It remains deeply concerned by militant Islamic movements, convinced they have made concerted attempts to radicalise the Muslim population in Xinjiang against Beijing.

But the potential strategic and economic benefits of successful engagement with the Taliban are huge, and thus are being actively pursued by Beijing. Before the US departure from Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted the Taliban political chief in Tianjin – where he had stood just two days earlier with US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman – seeking “friendly relations” with the Taliban.

The chaotic end to the 20-year US-led intervention in Afghanistan will have Western policymakers soul-searching and head-scratching for years to come. Now, other states are poised to fill the vacuum, but their ability to do so will depend heavily on the Taliban. As long as the likes of China remain engaged, the Taliban will have a powerful interest in maintaining a more moderate and nuanced posture.

If these relationships go sour, however, there is a real fear that the Taliban will return to its terror-supporting days, as frightening a thought for China as it is for the US. The chaos in Afghanistan might not be behind us just yet.

Hagai M. Segal is a leading authority on geopolitical issues, counterterrorism and the Middle East.

NYU LS Global Teaching Award

It has today been announced that Hagai is a 2020 recipient of the NYU Liberal Studies Teaching Award for Global Faculty.

The award recognises faculty members teaching Liberal Studies (LS) students at the NYU global sites for their excellence in teaching and commitment to global pedagogy in the LS curriculum.

Honorees exemplify excellence in interdisciplinary, global and decentered teaching, and help students connect to the global and local environment.

Nominations were submitted by students, and reviewed by a selection committee.

https://liberalstudies.nyu.edu/news-events/faculty/spring-2020/Global-Site-Faculty-Award.html

Refinitiv Energy Interactive 2020

On March 12th Hagai gave the opening keynote address to Refinitiv’s ‘Energy Interactive 2020’ conference in central London.

Refinitiv is one of the world’s largest providers of financial markets data and infrastructure, serving more than 40,000 institutions in approximately 190 countries.

Entitled ‘Geopolitics Impacting Energy Markets’, Hagai explored how global political dynamics - from the Middle-East to the US-China trade war - are affecting energy supply and price, yet why geopolitics is less chaotic than it can seem and thus how key trends can be identified and acted on today and going forward.

CLSA Investor's Forum 2019, Hong Kong.

From September 9th to 12th Hagai participated in the 26th CLSA Investor’s Forum in Hong Kong,

Run for over a quarter of a century by CLSA, Asia’s leading capital markets and investment group, the Forum each year brings together over 2,000 delegates from more than 40 countries, including over 1,500 global institutional investors and many hundreds of corporate executives.

Hagai gave one of the main-stage keynote addresses to the conference - on the topic of the Iran-Saudi / Sunni-Shia conflict driving political, strategic and economic events in the Middle-East and beyond - as well as hosting a number of meetings and briefings for key attendees/delegates.

Other keynote speakers at the Forum included John Kerry, former US Secretary of State, and Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia.

Briefing to the boards of Mordril Properties, KC Maritime + Chellsea

While in Hong Kong Hagai delivered a briefing to a joint breakfast gathering of board members of the Mordril Properties, Mordril Investments, KC Maritime and Chellsea companies.

Entitled ‘Contextualising Geopolitics - Trends, Patterns, Impacts, Assessment Tools’, Hagai provided a detailed analysis of current developments and trends in global politics, their economic impacts and implications, and the impacts of them on the businesses in attendance.

Financial Advice New Zealand annual conference

On August 22nd Hagai gave the opening keynote address in Auckland to the annual conference of Financial Advice New Zealand, the body representing the New Zealand financial advisor community, committed to ‘helping Kiwis thrive’.

The theme of the 2019 conference was ‘Be Brave, Be Bold’.

Hagai’s keynote, that gave a global context to the wide-ranging issues the conference was to address, was entitled ‘Being Brave And Bold In An Uncertain World’.

Assessing the likelihood of US-Iran war

Assessing the likelihood of US-Iran war

Key points

• In the short-term significant military clash or outright war unlikely.

• Both sides have other options, and war no longer the first/default option.

• Indirect conflict will thus significantly increase.

• So cyber to increase - enterprises in oil and gas sectors, and those in other strategic sectors linked to US, Saudi, and Israel, likely to be actively and individually targeted.

• In the medium- and long-term, however, the prognosis is more complex.

• Trump policy designed to render Iran incapable of power, so if US economic pressure continues Iran’s leaders may conclude that all-out war preferable to slow strategic death.

• If Trump remains President, and the Ayatollahs keep their grip on power in Iran, military confrontation of some form is thus a significant long-term likelihood.

Full analysis

As US-Iran tensions continue to rise I am (understandably!) increasingly being asked to assess the likelihood of war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

To answer this question the true nature of the strategic context needs to be grasped. But so does the true nature of what ‘war’ actually means in 2019 and going forward. Both factors are widely misunderstood.

Central to the current crisis is a profound change in US policy that came with the election of Donald Trump. President Trump has been entirely convinced by US allies in the Middle-East – from Saudi Arabia to the UAE to Israel – that Iran is seeking regional hegemony and aims to impose its extreme (Shiite) Islamic system upon the region and beyond, a nightmare scenario for the US and its (mainly Sunni Arab) allies. The logic behind Trump's complete rejection of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal signed by his predecessor with other world powers) emanates entirely from this viewpoint.

This has led Trump to adopt a policy designed to render Iran incapable of power - near-total economic isolation to stop it being able to funnel billions into Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen to tip the regional balance of power, and to dramatically worsen it's domestic economic strife, all in the hope that this inhibits Iran's strategic reach and maybe even forces a radical change in State policy.

Whereas in the past this might inevitably have led these countries into war with one another, the dynamic today is more complex, and indeed more nuanced. States rarely go to war directly with other States anymore - most military conflicts now are so-called 'Asymmetric' ones, fought by States against proxies of enemy States or with insurgents/terrorists/non-conventional forces.

And if you are a state like Iran - with significant military prowess but no match for the might of the US military machine - the priority thus becomes attaining specialism in achieving strategic objectives either indirectly or at least semi-directly. Thus Iran's decades of support for proxies from Gaza to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq to Yemen - lots of money, lots of weapons, lots of advice, but (until the outbreak of the civil wars in Syria and Yemen anyway) few of their your own actual troops and commanders.

By doing so they have dodged, evaded and circumvented US pressure for decades - breaking with this model and engaging in a direct conflict with the US, supported as it would be (overtly or tacitly) by most of the Arab world and Israel, would be a huge strategic gamble.

For major powers like the US, strategic objectives can also be attained today without having to default to military action. A whole suite of economic and technological measures are at hand that can be leveraged to massive and concerted effect, with cyber capability proving an absolute game-changer in this regard - realities that President Trump has started to grasp, as he publicly acknowledged after calling back the air strike.

Trump is certainly a chaos factor, with his penchant for impulse-based decision-making undoubtedly complicating matters - news that he told congressmen and senators that his decision whether or not to approve air strikes on Iran would be made by “My gut” was unsurprising, but no less frightening. But even for a Trump "Killing 150 people" (as he subsequently characterised the likely effect of this particular air strike) no longer needs to be the first response, even for a US president wishing to look 'tough’.

Instead the US leveraged these other tools, first a cyber strike - the Washington Post reporting that the US responded to the downing of its drone with major and sophisticated cyber-attacks that disabled the control systems of Iran’s rocket and missile launchers - followed by a new raft of economic sanctions.

Thus on both sides isolated military acts - a downing of a drone, attacking some oil tankers, or even an air strike in response - does not in 2019 inevitably mean war. The ‘Itchy trigger finger’ syndrome – that nearly led to US-Soviet nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 - is still alive, but a vastly less likely scenario today.

So in the short-term a significant US-Iran military clash or outright war - even with Trump in charge in the US, and the Ayatollahs in charge in Iran - remains unlikely.

Indirect conflict will thus significantly increase, with Iran likely to leverage to the maximum their regional allies and assets (in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen, etc) to cause as many headaches for the US as possible and to try and create doubt and/or disunity amongst the US’s regional allies. Russia, China and indeed Turkey will be vital Iranian allies in this effort.

Iran has for some time also been planning to use asymmetry as a deterrent against US military action - in recent years a number of Iranian-funded Hizbollah cells across the globe (from the UAE to Cyprus to the UK) have been broken-up, with multiple resultant convictions for planning future attacks in these countries. Intelligence and counter-terror agencies in the West and the Gulf fear that Iran will seek to apply pressure, and try to sour local public opinion, by waging ‘war’ not on the battlefield but via terror attacks on cities in the homelands of their adversaries.

And expect a rise in the cyber conflict on both sides, which will have significant commercial consequences for the private sector - enterprises in the oil and gas sectors, and those in other strategic sectors with strong links to the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, are likely to be actively and individually targeted.

It may indeed have started already - over the weekend cybersecurity companies CrowdStrike and FireEye were cited in news reports claiming that hackers linked to Iran have targeted US government agencies and a number of oil and gas firms with waves of attempted breaches. Oil and gas assets linked to the US, and in particular to Iranian adversaries in the Gulf, will remain priority targets.

In the medium- and long-term, however, the prognosis is more complex. If US economic pressure - that is almost now a full blockade - continues to grow it will become as large a strategic threat to Iran as being attacked. Iran’s leaders may come to the conclusion that all-out war is preferable to a slow economic and strategic death. As war might unite Iran's people around the regime, it might be preferable to the slow strangulation Trump is planning.

Trump hopes that it is exactly this that will bring Iran to the negotiating table, a belief no doubt encouraged by his complete misunderstanding of why he managed to find himself at one with Kim/the North Koreans.

The regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran have since 1979 defined foreign policy success as the ability to withstand and reverse US pressure, and this believe is only being reinforced by Trump’s policies and statements. Expecting pressure to naturally result in Iranian concessions or capitulation is simply naive and wishful thinking.

If Trump remains President, and the Ayatollahs keep their grip on power in Iran, military confrontation of some form is a significant long-term likelihood.

Consequence Of A Death Foretold --- Morsi's Death + Realpolitik 2019

It has been very easy for the international community to 'forget' Egypt, as attention has moved from the 2010/11 optimism of the ‘Arab Spring’ to Trump and his trade wars, Brexit, the chaos in Syria and Iraq, fighting ISIS/IS, terrorism, and nuclear and missile crises in North Korea and Iran.

The death of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has however briefly thrust Egypt back into the international limelight, and provided a stark reminder of the utter failure that Egypt's uprising has become.

Morsi had been brought to power as the first democratically elected President of Egypt following the triumphant protests of 2010 and 2011 that had unseated military dictator of four decades Hosni Mubarak. Morsi was however himself removed by the military just a year later, with the support of a majority of the Tahrir Square protesters fearful that they had swapped dictatorship for Muslim Brotherhood theocracy.

He has languished in prison since, only leaving to appear in courts for a variety of trials relating to his brief and controversial rule. He died in one such court, minutes after giving testimony.

What should be of most note is how little impact this news has had on international politicians and policy makers.

The death in a show trial of an elected leader deposed by military coup, following years of widely documented mistreatment in jail, might in other circumstances spark an international furore, condemnations from the UN Security Council, and demands for explanation and reprisal.

But when it comes to viewing the post-'Arab Spring' Middle-East and North Africa such considerations have long since been superseded by more practical concerns - Egypt may no longer be a democracy worthy of the name, but it is relatively stable, in the starkest of contrast to the chaos in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and neighbouring Libya.

Egypt - seen from Washington or London or Moscow - is now the good news story compared with most of a region still in the grips of political collapse and civil war.

Fifteen years ago a US Secretary Of State promised in Cairo that her government would no longer pursue stability over democracy - we can however safely assume that much of the international community has well and truly returned to the morally questionable yet strategically obvious logic that stability beats democracy every time.

So Egypt will again be quickly forgotten, its 100 million people - a quarter of all Arabs - increasingly repressed by a military government that strips back more and more of the political and social gains of 2010/11 with every day that passes.

Welcome to realpolitik, 2019 style.